Matching with Multiple Applications

We analyze the implications of multiple applications by job seekers for the microfoundations of the matching function. We emphasize a coordination failure caused by multiple applications, namely, that firms can waste resources processing applicants who are ultimately hired elsewhere.<P>This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V84-46SNFBV-2&_user=499884&_coverDate=01%2F31%2F2003&_rdoc=12&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%235860%232003%23999219998%23369093%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=5860&_sort=d&_docanchor=&_ct=22&_acct=C000024499&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=499884&md5=0077676f03ac7f2539b3b42529f2d7bb">'Economics Letters'</A>, 2003, 78(1), 67-70.

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Year of publication:	2001-09-07
Authors:	Albrecht, James W. ; Gautier, Pieter A. ; Vroman, Susan B.
Institutions:	Tinbergen Instituut
Subject:	search \| matching

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Number 01-080/3
Classification:	J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011256754