Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with nonnegative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Llerena, Francesc ; Pallarola, Carlos Rafels
Institutions:	Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona
Subject:	zero-monotonic \| convex games \| lattice \| modular games \| games \| cooperative tu-game

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Series:	Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Documents de Treball Number 123 14 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005138819