Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Berga Colom, Dolors ; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 90.2000, 1, p. 39-61
|
Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter | Theorie | Theory |
-
Taxes or fees? : The political economy of providing excludable public goods
Swope, Kurtis J., (2001)
-
Choice correspondences for public goods
Klaus, Bettina, (2002)
-
Taxes or fees? : The political economy of providing excludable public goods
Swope, Kurtis J., (2005)
- More ...
-
Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
Berga Colom, Dolors, (1996)
-
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Hatsumi, Kentaro, (2014)
-
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Hatsumi, Kantaro, (2011)
- More ...