Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.

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Year of publication:	1999-01-28
Authors:	Neme, Alejandro ; MassÔ, Jordi ; BarberÁ, Salvador
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 16.1999, 2, p. 321-336
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 28 April 1997/Accepted: 30 January 1998
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369311