Maximal extractable value: Current understanding, categorization, and open research questions

In traditional financial markets, front-running is a well-structured phenomenon. It represents a form of privileged actors utilizing knowledge or power advantages to extract undue profit at the cost of other stakeholders. Various mitigation strategies have emerged, ranging from market design to regulatory measures. More recently, a similar and substantially richer variety of means to gain unethical profit from power asymmetries has appeared in the context of blockchain-based decentralized applications. This phenomenon is called “maximal extractable value” (MEV). Despite the decentralized nature and inherent transparency of blockchain ledgers, MEV is particularly prevalent and challenging to mitigate. While related work in computer science and algorithmic game theory has already identified several different ways in which MEV manifests in decentralized finance (DeFi) and outlined partial solution approaches, a discussion of its impacts in the information systems (IS) domain is still absent. A holistic definition of MEV and how it can be exploited is necessary for the discussion of its potential implications for blockchain-based IS for businesses and public institutions. This paper conducts a systematic literature review to close this gap. It consolidates the diverging definitions of MEV and provides a categorization of the different ways in which it can manifest. As such, we synthesize and review the existing state of knowledge on MEV and point to undiscovered areas relevant to decentralized electronic markets in the form of a research agenda.