Measuring and explaining the impact of vertical product differentiation on banking efficiency

Purpose – The paper attempts to analyze vertical product differentiation as a strategy pursued by European banks seeking greater market power and higher reputation for quality, and to examine whether this entails losses in banking efficiency. Design/methodology/approach – First, the empirical analysis seeks to demonstrate whether borrowers at banks in Europe are willing to pay a premium to operate with banks that attempt to increase their reputation for quality in the market, i.e. whether banks use quality to vertically differentiate and so soften competition. To test such hypothesis requires us to define an empirical model with variables that describe certain characteristics of banking quality as explanatory variables of the loan interest to the market interest rate margin. This model is estimated by two stage least squares. Second, the paper seeks to test whether the market power derived from vertical product differentiation (quality reputation) prevents banks from operating efficiently. To test this hypothesis first we estimated cost efficiency taking into account bank risk preferences and then we define an empirical model that relates the results on efficiency with the margin of interest loan rate over the market interest rate. Findings – The results show that less competition, deriving from a bank's ability to differentiate its services from those of its rivals through quality, is positive because it helps to provide a more stable banking system. Moreover, the banking market power generated by investing in quality does not prevent banks from operating efficiently from a production point of view. Research limitations/implications – The findings are consistent with the view that European banks soften competition by being more stable, and this does not prevent cost efficiency. So it seems that the regulatory authorities should improve their solvency measures since borrowers’ preferences are to maintain relationships with non‐fragile banks, and on the other hand banks’ risk preferences seem to be to look for sound borrowers. Practical implications – Frontier cost efficiency scores that account for bank's risk preference are able to be related with customer preferences based on the model of the industrial organization (10) based on vertical product differentiation in banking. Originality/value – This is the first paper that relates vertical product differentiation with the results obtained from the literature on x‐efficiency. It is also the first paper that studies the impact of banking market power jointly with cost efficiency in social efficiency when market power comes as result of investing in reputation for banking quality.