Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer : a canonical mechanism approach
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Kojima, Naoki |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 3, p. 693-719
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Subject: | Multi-dimensional mechanism | Indirect mechanism | Budget constraint | Revelation principle | Taxation principle | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Budgetrestriktion | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Öffentlicher Haushalt | Public budget |
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