Mechanism design with information acquisition
Sushil Bikhchandani, Ichiro Obara
| Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Bikhchandani, Sushil ; Obara, Ichiro |
| Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 63.2017, 3, p. 783-812
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| Subject: | Information acquisition | Full surplus extraction | Efficient implementation | Mechanism design | Bayesian implementation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00199-016-0964-5 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011740057