Mechanism design with maxmin agents : theory and and an application to bilateral trade
Alexander Wolitzky
| Year of publication: |
September 2016
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Wolitzky, Alexander |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 3, p. 971-1004
|
| Subject: | Mechanism design | maxmin | ambiguity aversion | bilateral trade | Myerson-Satterthwaite | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE2089 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584288