Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints

We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent. We identify a sufficient condition, that does not depend on the distribution of types, under which these two solutions coincide.

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Year of publication:	2004-09-13
Authors:	Celik, Gorkem
Institutions:	Vancouver School of Economics
Subject:	Mechanism Design \| Incentive Compatibility

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Microeconomics.ca working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	0 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10004970934