Mediocracy, Fourth Version

We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.

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Year of publication:	2011-01-24
Authors:	Mattozzi, Andrea ; Merlo, Antonio
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Subject:	Politicians \| Parties \| Political Recruitment \| Electoral Systems

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	PIER Working Paper Archive.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	35 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608019