Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?
We study horizontal mergers on two-sided markets between horizontally differentiated platforms. We provide a theoretical analysis of the merger's price effect based on the amount of cost savings it generates, the behavior of outsider platforms, and the size of cross-group network effects. We point out differences as compared with the standard, one-sided merger analysis, and also discuss the merger control policy implications.
Year of publication: |
2014-11
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Authors: | Baranes, Edmond ; Cortade, Thomas ; Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea |
Institutions: | LAboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Faculté de sciences économiques |
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