Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games: Some (Im-)Possibility Results

Solutions for cooperative games with side-payments can be manipulated by merging a coalition of players into a single player, or, conversely, splitting a player into a number of smaller players. This paper establishes some (im-)possibility results concerning merging- or splitting-proofness of core solutions of balanced and convex games.

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Year of publication:	2005-10
Authors:	Knudsen, Peter Holch ; Østerdal, Lars Peter
Institutions:	Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet
Subject:	cooperative games \| manipulation \| Dutta-Ray solution

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 05-19 13 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749565