Migration and the Evolution of Conventions.

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to the new environment.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Bhaskar, V ; Vega-Redondo, F
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	ECONOMIC MODELS \| GAMES

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Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	27 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572234