Mitigating moral hazard in insurance contracts using risk preference design
Shutian Liu, Quanyan Zhu
| Year of publication: |
2025
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| Authors: | Liu, Shutian ; Zhu, Quanyan |
| Published in: |
Operations research letters : a journal of INFORMS devoted to the rapid publication of concise contributions in operations research. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 1467065-3. - Vol. 62.2025, Art.-No. 107322, p. 1-8
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| Subject: | Insurance contract | Moral hazard | Principal-agent problem | Risk preference design | Moral Hazard | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance | Risiko | Risk | Risikomodell | Risk model | Versicherung | Insurance | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107322 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015432303