Mixed-ownership reform and deleveraging of state-owned enterprises : degree and methods

Based on data of state-owned enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2018, this study examines how mixed-ownership reform affects the deleveraging behaviour of state-owned enterprises (hereafter, SOEs). We find that the higher the degree of equity balance between state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders of SOEs, the more inclined they are to choose to deleverage. As for the methods of deleveraging, they are more inclined to choose retained earnings and current debt repayment in the deleveraging process. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for SOEs with excess leverage, in low marketisation regions and pronounced for both centre SOEs and local SOEs. We also find that mixed-ownership reform increases deleveraging SOEs’ operating performance. The results suggest that mixed-ownership reform can efficiently promote the deleveraging behaviour of SOEs in positive ways.