Mixed-Ownership Structure, Non-State-Blockholder Coalition, and Tax Avoidance

This study examines the relationship between a coalition of non-state blockholders and corporate tax avoidance in a context in which state and non-state ownership coexist and the ownership structure is concentrated. The results show that the dominance of the non-state-blockholder coalition, defined as a situation wherein non-state blockholders’ total shareholding is greater than that of state blockholders among the top 10 largest shareholders, is positively associated with corporate tax avoidance. We identify two channels through which the non-state-blockholder coalition influences tax avoidance behavior, namely an increase in the number of shareholder meetings and the availability of online voting at shareholder meetings. We also find that the non-state-blockholder coalition is more effective when coalition members are more likely to coordinate, as indicated by having fewer members, greater shareholding stability, and lack of foreign shareholders within a coalition