Mixed strategy equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate: A comment

This note complements Aragonès and Palfrey (2002) [2] by providing upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium payoff of the advantaged (disadvantaged) candidate for any symmetric distribution of the median voterʼs ideal policy and any (even or odd) number of equidistant locations. These bounds point to a negative (positive) relationship between the equilibrium payoff of the (dis)advantaged candidate and the uncertainty regarding the median voterʼs preferences.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Xefteris, Dimitrios
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 147.2012, 1, p. 393-396
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Spatial competition \| Mixed strategies \| Candidate quality

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042959