Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach
This paper analyzes the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and cooperative Nash bargaining solutions are determined under various assumptions about r ationing regimes in goods and labor markets and structural characteristics of the economies involved.
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Aarle, Bas van ; Engwerda, Jacob ; Plasmans, Joseph ; Weeren, Arie |
Institutions: | CESifo |
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