Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach
This paper analyzes the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and cooperative Nash bargaining solutions are determined under various assumptions about r ationing regimes in goods and labor markets and structural characteristics of the economies involved.
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | van Aarle, Bas ; Engwerda, Jacob ; Plasmans, Joseph ; Weeren, Arie |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 262 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 757237754 [GVK] hdl:10419/75561 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_262 [RePEc] |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010314924
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