Monetary Conservatism and Fiscal Coordination in a Monetary Union

In a monetary union time inconsistency provides the rationale for central bank conservativeness and against the coordination of national fiscal policies. We show that this result is based on the implicit assumption of exogenous labor markets and that, once wage setters' behavior is explicitly modelled, the economic performance can be improved by fiscal policy coordination and a less conservative monetary policy stance

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; Acocella, Nicola ; Tirelli, Patrizio
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Währungsunion \| Monetary union \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy \| Theorie \| Theory \| Finanzpolitik \| Fiscal policy \| Gewerkschaft \| Trade union

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.880524 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059758