Monitoring in Tournaments

We show that less monitoring can increase effort and alleviate the moral hazard problem in tournaments. We also find a unique optimal level of monitoring based on contestants' abilities. As the difference between their abilities gets larger, the contest designer should monitor less.

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Year of publication:	2014-07-08
Authors:	Kim, Jaesoo ; Park, Jongwoo
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 34.2014, 3, p. 1431-1437
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	tournament \| moral hazard \| monitoring

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	M5 - Personnel Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796127