Moral and Amoral Conceptions of Trust, with an Application in Organizational Ethics

Across the management, social science, and business ethics literatures, and in much of the philosophy literature, trust is characterized as a disposition to act given epistemic states—beliefs and/or expectations about others and about the risks involved. This characterization of trust is best thought of as epistemological because epistemic states distinguish trust from other dispositions. The epistemological characterization of trust is the amoral one referred to in the title of this paper, and we argue that this characterization is conceptually inadequate. We outline and defend an alternative conception of trust as a moral phenomenon: when A trusts B to do something, A invites B to acknowledge and accept an obligation; when B accepts the invitation, B takes on an obligation; in that way trust creates an obligation. We conclude with an application, drawing out the difference between the epistemological conception of trust and our own in the context of Ghoshal et al.’s (Sloan Management Review 40:9–20, <CitationRef CitationID="CR22">1995</CitationRef>, Academy of Management Learning & Education 4:75–91, <CitationRef CitationID="CR20">2005</CitationRef>) critique of transaction cost theories of the firm. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2013