Moral Hazard and the Demand for Physician Services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment

This paper presnets first empirical results on moral hazard in demand for physician services, using a longitudinal dataset on 4578 individuals followed during two years. The data set contains two subgroups, one for which a copayment rate of 10% for physician visits was introduced in 1994, and an other for which no change occured during the period of the study. This enables us to use these date as coming from a controlled natural experiment.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Chiappori, P.A. ; Durand, F. ; Geoffard, P.Y.
Institutions:	Département et Laboratoire d'Économie Théorique Appliquée (DELTA), École Normale Supérieure (ENS Paris)
Subject:	MORAL HAZARD \| HEALTH SERVICES \| INSURANCE

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Series:	DELTA Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	19 pages
Classification:	D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets ; G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256749