Moral Hazard in a model of Bank Run with Noisy Signals

We show that multiple equilibria exist in a model of bank run with moral hazard. Furthermore, this is true even with noisy signals on the economic fundamentals. We argue that the conditions under which this happens can arise naturally in models of banking with moral hazard problem.

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Year of publication:	2003-06-04
Authors:	Boonprakaikawe, Juntip ; Ghosal, S.
Institutions:	Royal Economic Society - RES
Subject:	banking \| fundamentals \| signals \| equilibria

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Series:	Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, 2003 Number 27
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005232493