Moving-Horizon Control in Dynamic Games

We consider a continuous-time system influenced by different agents who adopt moving-horizon control. The well-known Nash equilibrium concept is used to define two concepts for solutions fitting into the moving-horizon structure. One of them is analyzed in more detail among the class of linear quadratic games. The (dis)advantages of the moving-horizon control are illustrated by means of a government debt stabilization model.

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Year of publication:	1999-03-01
Authors:	Broek, W. A. van den
Institutions:	Society for Computational Economics - SCE

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Computing in Economics and Finance 1999.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Computing in Economics and Finance '99 Number 122
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537731