Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants׳ expected highest effort.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Segev, Ella ; Sela, Aner
Published in:	European Economic Review. - Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921. - Vol. 70.2014, C, p. 371-382
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Sequential contests \| All-pay auctions

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048568