Multi-Store Competition: Market Segmentation or Interlacing?

This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using thefact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium isunique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Janssen, Maarten C.W. ; Karamychev, Vladimir A. ; van Reeven, Peran
Publisher:	Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Einzelhandel \| Filiale \| Marktsegmentierung \| Hotelling-Modell \| multi-store competition \| hotelling \| interlacing

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Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 03-033/1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	834993805 [GVK] hdl:10419/85802 [Handle] RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20030033 [RePEc]
Classification:	I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; D10 - Household Behavior and Family Economics. General ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324774