Multi-Store Competition: Market Segmentation or Interlacing?

This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets.

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Year of publication:	2003-04-10
Authors:	Janssen, Maarten C.W. ; Karamychev, Vladimir A. ; Reeven, Peran van
Institutions:	Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	multi-store competition \| hotelling \| interlacing

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Number 03-033/1
Classification:	I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; D10 - Household Behavior and Family Economics. General ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209529