Multi-task principal-agent analyses : incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design
Year of publication: |
1990
|
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Authors: | Holmström, Bengt ; Milgrom, Paul |
Publisher: |
Stanford, Calif. |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Arbeitsgestaltung | Job design |
Extent: | 47 S |
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Series: | Technical report series / Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, Stanford University. - Stanford, Calif., ZDB-ID 2625968-0. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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