Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences

I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this set-up, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy- proof. Both solutions are disjoint.

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Ortega, Josué
Publisher:	Mannheim : Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Subject:	dichotomous preferences \| multi-unit assignment \| Lorenz dominance \| competitive equilibrium with equal incomes

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Series:	ZEW Discussion Papers ; 18-052
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1043593543 [GVK] hdl:10419/190567 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18052 [RePEc]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Source:	EconStor

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