Multilateral Agricultural Trade Negotiations: A Non-cooperative and Cooperative Game Approach.
Agricultural trade negotiations are modelled using a non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of the games. Through the use of intra-country compensation, the analysis shows that the US is able to convince the EU to adopt modest reform. With inter-country compensation the EU chooses a decreased level of protection, but does not choose completely free trade. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Kennedy, P Lynn ; von Witzke, Harald ; Roe, Terry L |
Published in: |
European Review of Agricultural Economics. - European Association of Agricultural Economists - EAAE, ISSN 1464-3618. - Vol. 23.1996, 4, p. 381-99
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Publisher: |
European Association of Agricultural Economists - EAAE |
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