Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers

We present a game in which n persons split a cake, where a distinction between conditional and unconditional offers is made. This distinction sheds light on the contrasting results obtained in the previous literature of multilateral bargaining. By allowing the proposer to make both conditional and unconditional offers, we show that the game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.

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Year of publication:	2002-02-26
Authors:	Huang, Chen-Ying
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 20.2002, 2, p. 401-412
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Bargaining \| Conditional and unconditional offers

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: March 13, 2001
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005371066