Multilateral Bargaining with Discrete Surplus

Krishna and Serrano (1996) show a unique and efficient outcome in a model of multilateral bargaining. We show that the predictability of the model critically depends on the nature of the surplus i.e. whether it is continuous or discrete. We show that the model suffers from multiple equilibria and severe inefficiency when the surplus is discrete, not continuous as assumed in Krishna and Serrano (1996), and players are patient enough.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015-10-10
Authors:	Maurya, Amit Kumar

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Maurya, Amit Kumar (2015): Multilateral Bargaining with Discrete Surplus.
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249595