Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Chowdhury, Subhasish M. ; Sheremeta, Roman M. |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 2, p. 216-219
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Rent-seeking Contest Asymmetric equilibrium Multiple equilibria |
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