Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and forced CEO turnover
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhong, Ruohan ; Li, Yanxi ; Wang, Yun |
Published in: |
Emerging markets review. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1566-0141, ZDB-ID 2025202-X. - Vol. 48.2021, p. 1-25
|
Subject: | Control contests | Forced CEO turnover | Multiple large shareholders | Ownership identity | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Führungswechsel | Executive turnover | Theorie | Theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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