Multiple penalty mechanisms in a principal-agent model under different institutional arrangements
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Earnhart, Dietrich |
Published in: |
Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the Association for Comparative Economic Studies. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0147-5967, ZDB-ID 715350-8. - Vol. 27.1999, 1, p. 168-189
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Strafe | Punishment | Marktwirtschaft | Market economy | Planwirtschaft | Planned economy | Theorie | Theory |
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