Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness

This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Dai, Meixing
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 30.2010, 3, p. 1720-1726
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Multiplicative uncertainty \| optimal degree of conservativeness \| Brainard conservatism \| central bank transparency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568477