Multisided matching games with complementarities

The paper considers multisided matching games with transfereable utility using the approach of cooperative game theory. Stable matchings are shown to exist when characteristic functions are supermodular, i.e., agents' abilities to contribute to the value of a coalition are complementary across types. We analyze the structure of the core of supermodular matching games and suggest an algorithm for constructing its extreme payoff vectors.

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Year of publication:	1999-12-15
Authors:	Sherstyuk, Katerina
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 28.1999, 4, p. 489-509
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Matching games \| supermodular functions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received February 1997/Final version September 1998
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755780