Multitask principal-agent analyses : incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Holmström, Bengt |
Other Persons: | Milgrom, Paul (contributor) |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 7.1991, p. 24-52
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Theorie | Theory |
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