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Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options

We introduce a weighted version of the component efficient χ-value [Casajus, A., 2009. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability. Games and Economic Behavior 65 (1), 49–61] for TU games with a coalition structure. We provide characterizations both for a symmetric and for an asymmetric treatment of outside options. Further, the stability of coalition structures is explored. These concepts are applied to apex games.
Year of publication:
2013
Authors: Casajus, André ; Tutić, Andreas
Published in:
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 66.2013, 3, p. 262-267
Publisher: Elsevier
Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065162
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