Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs) in this environment, and prove that some well-known SCCs are Maskin monotonic ( but they do not satisfy no-veto power) and hence Nash implementable.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Doghmi, Ahmed
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336. - Vol. 4.2013, 1, p. 38-49
Publisher:	Basel : MDPI
Subject:	Nash implementation \| allocation problem \| single-dipped preferences

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g4010038 [DOI] 749751878 [GVK] hdl:10419/98516 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369380