Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments

A feasible mechanism is constructed which weakly Nash-implements the weak Pareto choice rule over a certain class of indecomposable pure-exchange environments, where there may be no private goods whose consumption has no external effects.

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Year of publication:	1997-11-27
Authors:	Osana, Hiroaki
Published in:	Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 3.1997, 1, p. 57-74
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Feasible mechanism \| Nash implementation \| weak Pareto choice rule \| indecomposable environments

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 30 November 1995 / Accepted: 24 June 1997
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D52 - Incomplete Markets ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753084