Nash’s Bargaining Solution When the Disagreement Point is Random

In his seminal work, Nash (1950) derives a solution for two-person bargaining problems, within a cooperative setup. Nash assumes that the result of disagreement is known to both players and is not stochastic. We study the same problem, where the last assumption is relaxed. We provide a set of axioms which characterizes a natural generalization

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Smorodinsky, Rann
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2005 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 7, 2012 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109650