National Hockey League guaranteed contracts : a principal agent problem impacting on performance
Jon Landry, David Edgar and John Harris (Department of Business Management, Glasgow School for Business and Society, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK), and Kevin Grant (Kent Business School, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK)
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Landry, Jon ; Edgar, David ; Harris, John ; Grant, Kevin |
| Published in: |
Management research review. - Bingley : Emerald, ISSN 2040-8269, ZDB-ID 2535152-7. - Vol. 38.2015, 12, p. 1306-1330
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| Subject: | National hockey league | Guaranteed contracts | Pay to performance problem | Principal agent problem | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Profisport | Professional sports | Ballsport | Ball game | Vertrag | Contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1108/MRR-06-2014-0146 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011448183