In the 1990s, Algeria experienced a violent civil war with various atrocities. Civilians confronted violence from both state forces and from extremist armed groups. The suspension of the electoral process in 1992 by the military, which was associated with profound societal polarisation and economic bankruptcy, resulted in massive human rights violations. Thousands of suspected Islamists were detained under a variety of politically motivated charges. Torture, extrajudicial killings, kidnapping, and assassination were widespread in parts of the country since the beginning of the war. In the meantime, the Islamist insurgency expanded and took a large part of the country. In 1994-1995, according to official statements, one-third of the country was under the control of the insurgency. Those who were highly critical of the intolerant direction, policies, and acts of both state forces and armed groups, were themselves vulnerable to violence. These included religious leaders, journalists, teachers, professors, lawyers, intellectuals, politicians, and ordinary people. Since 1996, with the militarisation of society and the multiplication of extremist armed groups, violence intensified at an alarming rate and expanded dramatically in terms of geographical locations and targeted groups. New extremist doctrines emerged, and state violence against civilians was exacerbated: violence became highly fragmented. Those, particularly in western prefectures and the municipalities surrounding the capital, were more likely to encounter massacres, and suicide attacks. Mass killings at Bentalha, Ghelizan, and Sidi Moussa are typical examples of the atrocities and human rights violations of that period against soft targets. As a response, powerful factions in the military establishment asserted the need for dialogue and negotiation to end the cycle of violence and to protect the unity of the country. Therefore, contacts between belligerent camps were re-established and the government started preparing for a national reconciliation project that could eradicate the extremism and bring the war to an end. Despite the reconciliation process being frequently linked to the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (CNPR), planning for this project began with the first contacts with armed groups. Even belligerent camps used the term 'reconciliation' for the plan for ending violence and for reforging social links across the battle lines. This process for enhancing peace was highly centralised and based on security priorities. Civil society organizations played a remarkable role during the war in documenting atrocities and in promoting a human rights regime. Nevertheless, the Algerian government chose to craft the reconciliation plan behind closed doors without involving third parties. The international community, opposition, and bottom-up associations were effectively shut out. Only a few documents and reports illustrating the main articles and prerequisites of the peace agreement that set the terms for the reconciliation project were published. Successive critics took issue with the reconciliation process in Algeria. However, it is undeniable that the initiative contributed decisively to the decrease in violence and the demobilization of more than 9,000 insurgents. Moreover, the social and economic reconstruction plan that came with reconciliation mitigated the societal polarizations that led to war and marginalised extremist doctrines. The process succeeded in containing the violent spiral and did so while protecting the territorial unity of the country from collapse and international interference. However, the post-war regime failed to promote a comprehensive agenda for rehabilitating interpersonal relations, enhancing the rule of law, and consolidating the human rights regime.
