Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion

Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini

Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow to credibly deter tacit collusion.

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Year of publication:	October 22, 2014
Authors:	Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca
Publisher:	Bologna, Italy : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics
Subject:	tacit collusion \| nationalization \| mixed oligopoly \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Preiskartell \| Price-fixing cartel \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Quaderni - working paper DSE / Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics. - Bologna : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2282-6483, ZDB-ID 2125055-8. - Vol. no 972
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4091 [DOI] hdl:10419/159810 [Handle]
Classification:	h13 ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L32 - Public Enterprises
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011725688