Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
Year of publication: |
2017
|
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Authors: | Lombardi, Michele ; Yoshihara, Naoki |
Publisher: |
Amherst, MA : University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics |
Subject: | Nash equilibrium | exchange economies | intrinsic preferences for responsibility, | boundary problem | price-quantity mechanism |
Series: | Working Paper ; 2017-05 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 880361603 [GVK] hdl:10419/174414 [Handle] RePEc:ums:papers:2017-05 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Source: |
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Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
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