Negotiating to Avoid Gradual versus Dangerous Climate Change: An Experimental Test of Two Prisoners' Dilemma
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barrett, Scott ; Dannenberg, Astrid |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | climate change | prisoners’ dilemma | catastrophe | negotiations | cooperation | uncertainty | experimental economics |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 4573 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 776424882 [GVK] hdl:10419/89722 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_4573 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions ; H41 - Public Goods ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues ; Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters |
Source: |
-
Barrett, Scott, (2014)
-
Barrett, Scott, (2014)
-
On the Sensitivity of Collective Action to Uncertainty about Climate Tipping Points
Barrett, Scott, (2014)
- More ...
-
On the Sensitivity of Collective Action to Uncertainty about Climate Tipping Points
Barrett, Scott, (2014)
-
Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
Barrett, Scott, (2015)
-
Tipping versus cooperating to supply a public good
Barrett, Scott, (2015)
- More ...