Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium

This article characterizes the set of correlated equilibria that result from open negotiations, which players make prior to playing a strategic game. A negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium is defined as a correlated strategy in which the negotiation process among all of the players prevents the formation of any improving coalitional deviation. Additionally, this notion of equilibrium is adapted to general games with incomplete information.

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Year of publication:	2011-12
Authors:	Ziros, Nicholas
Institutions:	University of Cyprus Department of Economics
Subject:	Correlated equilibrium \| coalitions \| negotiation \| incomplete information

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	17 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368870